Brokerage in Indonesian Politics by Redaksi, Dewan
E D I T O R ’ S  F O R E W O R D
Brokerage in Indonesian Politics
“Brokers are local intermediaries who provide targeted benefits and 
solve problems for their followers; in exchange, they request follower’s 
participation in political activities such as rallies—and often demand 
their votes”. 
(Stokes et al. 2013)
The statement above implies that brokers have a considerable influence 
in electoral politics. In elections, politicians often need brokers to be 
the middlemen who connect them with voters (Scott 1972). They can 
help distribute goods effectively because of their extensive knowledge of 
their territory and the voters’ behavior (Stokes et al. 2013). While brokers 
assist the political candidates, they also benefit from this clientelistic 
interaction since they can receive a financial reward or other resources 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). However, there are also brokers who 
truly believe in a candidate’s political missions and virtue. They will 
always act as loyal supporters regardless of whether they get benefits or 
not. These types of brokers are usually people who have family, ethnic, 
religious affective ties with the candidate (Aspinall 2014).
The practice of brokerage is prevalent in many democratic coun-
tries, including Indonesia. Studies that focus on cases in the country 
explained how clientelism works with brokers in the national and local 
elections (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019; Aspinall and Rohman 2017; 
Darwin 2017). Like many other countries, vote brokerage networks in 
Indonesia rely on grassroots brokers who were typically formal or in-
formal community leaders, like village heads and religious figures (Be-
renschot 2019). They worked on the candidate’s behalf, convinced their 
neighbors or colleagues to vote for the candidate, and often distributed 
money or goods on his or her behalf (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2019).
Most articles on this issue will explore clientelism and political bro-
kerage in Indonesia and how they relate to the voting behavior of the 
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people. The first and second articles will illustrate how brokers work in 
local politics. The following two articles will discuss how brokers cam-
paign for presidential candidates in the 2019 election. The last article 
will address the civil-military relationship in Sri Lanka. Lastly, a book 
review about vote buying is also included. 
The first article, written by M. Najib Husein and La Husen Zuada, 
investigates the practice of money politics in Kendari local elections. 
The article entitled “Money Trumps Ethnicity: An Overview of Local 
Election in Kendari” describes how money politics and ethnic politics 
work in a local election, then comparing which one is more powerful 
to influence an election. The authors demonstrate that the vote buying 
strategies are more effective in gaining votes than promoting ethnic 
identity. Vote buying worked systematically alongside bureaucratic and 
party forces, while the strategy of ethnic politics failed to maintain vot-
ers’ loyalty. In other words, money politics had successfully disrupted 
ethnic politics.
The second article in this issue, titled “Refusing to Die: Program-
matic Goods in the Fight against COVID-19 in Sampang Regency” 
will talk about distributive politics during the coronavirus pandemic 
in Sampang Regency—one area in East Java that is quite successful in 
dealing with the spread of the COVID-19. The authors, Endik Hidayat 
and Daniel Susilo, argue that there has been a change in the allocation 
of resources in the villages, which initially tended to be clientelistic to 
programmatic. This shift was caused by the changing power relations 
between the regent and village heads. The authors argue that during 
the crisis, these village leaders become effective brokers in distributing 
political goods without making transactional efforts that emphasize 
personal gain.
The third article, written by Muhammad Naziful Haq, explains 
the role of the “middle-agents” of each presidential candidate in the 
2019 election, Jokowi and Prabowo, to produce populist discourses in 
the post-truth era. The article entitled “Patronizing the Mass: How 
Middle-Agents Deepened Populism and Post-Truth in Indonesia 2019 
Presidential Election” shows how the online propaganda carried out by 
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these middle-agents influences voters in Indonesia. Using social media 
data, the author tries to explain that middle-agents like religious leaders 
or partisan influencers escalated and sharpened the level of divisiveness 
and partisanship. Haq concludes that these middle-agents’ strong effect 
is due to their activities in conveying manipulative, divisive, and hateful 
messages on social media.
The fourth article, titled “Explaining the Effects of Political Islam 
and Preacher toward Prabowo’s Electoral Dominance: Evidence from 
Pekanbaru and Kampar,” is written by Andhik Beni Saputra, Azhari 
Setiawan, and Hesti Herpina. In line with the previous article, it exam-
ines the role of a popular religious figure in affecting voting behavior 
in the presidential election in 2019. This article shows that religion 
is still a significant factor in influencing voters, especially in the two 
most populous areas in Riau Province. Saputra, Setiawan, and Herpina 
highlight that the rise of political Islam in Indonesia has provided mo-
mentum for proselytizers to take part in the political arena. The authors 
argue that Islamic preachers (ulama) could determine a candidate’s 
superiority over the other. They also conclude that this practice could 
be exploited by other candidates pursuing official public positions by 
campaigning themselves using religious preachers. At the end of the 
article, the authors warn that this situation could degrade the quality 
of Indonesian democracy.
Our last article is written by Izzan Fathurrahman and Evida Kartini, 
with the title “Unequal Civilian Accommodation within Democratic 
Rule: The Case of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province after the Govern-
ment–LTTE Conflict.” Fathurrahman and Kartini reveal an imbalance 
in the relationship between the civilian government and the military in 
Sri Lanka. Using Alfred Stepan’s framework, this article explains that 
the Sri Lankan military has a low intensity of competition and a high 
degree of privilege. The authors argue that this imbalance of power 
occurred due to the weak civilian control during the crisis and the 
military’s success in taking over its domestic role and policy-making 
power. According to the authors, this form of relationship is seen as a 
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middle way for Sri Lanka’s democratic government to share its power 
with the military.
We end this issue with a book review, written by Fuadil ‘Ulum 
entitled “Institutional Design and Money Politics: Vote Buying in Post-
Suharto Era.” The reviewed book is a work by Burhanuddin Muhtadi 
with the original title of “Kuasa Uang: Politik Uang dalam Pemilu 
Pasca Orde-Baru.” According to ‘Ulum, this book seeks to explain 
how the changes in the post-New Order electoral system’s design have 
contributed to creating an ecosystem for politicians to reshape their 
electoral strategy and rely on clientelistic networks. ‘Ulum points up 
that the author of this book was able to clearly and thoroughly explain 
money politics in Indonesia, starting from its causes, effectiveness, and 
mechanisms. In the end of his review, ‘Ulum highlights that this book 
contributes to academia because of its mixed methodology that has 
not been widely used in the study of money politics in Indonesia and 
its novelty, which can explain the unique context of vote buying in 
Indonesia compared to other countries’ case.
Finally, we want to thank all the reviewers for their support. We 
also hope this issue can provide the readers with the latest insight and 
knowledge in political science, especially in Indonesian politics. Happy 
reading!
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